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SURVEY OF NEW YORK PRACTICE
court," the Court did not reach the question of the applicability of
the Statute of Frauds to an oral stipulation.';
While the courts generally favor the resolution of issues by stipu-
lation of the parties, CPLR 2104's requirement that such agreements
be in Writing is intended to insure that courts will not be confronted
constantly with the task of resolving controverted issues of fact which
invariably arise out of oral stipulations. The statute excepts open
court stipulations because they are generally recorded, and the Dolgin
decision recognized that an extension of this exception to informal
conferences would defeat its purpose.
ARTICLE 30- REMEDIES AND PLEADING
CPLR 3015(a): Where plaintiff alleges performance of contractual
conditions precedent, requirement that defendant deny such perfor-
mance with particularity is not applicable.
CPLR 3015(a) provides that the performance or occurrence of
conditions precedent in a contract need not be pleaded. Hence, in
order to raise a triable issue with respect to any such condition, the
defendant must indicate "specifically and with particularity" those con-
ditions which he contends have not been fulfilled.67
In Allis-Chalmers Manufacturing Co. v. Malan Construction
Corp.,68 the plaintiff alleged that certain conditions precedent had
been performed, and the defendant entered a general denial.69 When
the defendant attempted to examine the plaintiff during its pretrial
examination regarding its performance under the contract, it was pre-
cluded by the court from doing so. The Court of Appeals unanimously
not be embroiled in inchoate, unprovable arrangements, in which the court or its officers
play a part." Id. at 11, 286 N.E.2d at 234, 334 N.Y.S.2d at 841.
66 The alleged agreement involved the transfer of land and would ordinarily come
under the purview of General Obligations Law §§ 5-703 and 15-501. However, some
courts have held that such an oral stipulation made in open court is not barred by the
Statute of Frauds. See Anders v. Anders, 6 App. Div. 2d 440, 179 N.Y.S.2d 274 (Ist Dep't
1958); Rudolph v. Cinco, 34 Misc. 2d 1016, 229 N.Y.S.2d 892 (Sup. Ct. Westchester County
1962). The Dolgin Court characterized this authority as "sparse but persuasive." 31
N.Y.2d at 8, 286 N.E.2d at 232, 334 N.Y.S.2d at 839.
07 A host of cases illustrate this rule. See, e.g., Lourie v. Mishkin, 279 App. Div. 754,
108 N.Y.S.2d 777 (2d Dep't 1951) (mem.); Arrow Plumbing Co. v. Dare Constr. Corp., 212
N.Y.S.2d 438 (Sup. Ct. Nassau County 1961); Rao v. Katz, 6 Misc. 2d 760, 161 N.Y.S.2d
504 (Sup. Ct. Kings County 1957); Koeppel v. Koeppel, 138 N.Y.S.2d 366 (Sup. Ct. Queens
County 1954); Kapper v. Greenfield, 100 N.Y.S.2d 921 (Sup. Ct. Kings County 1948).
These cases construed RCP 92, the predecessor of CPLR 3015(a).
68 30 N.Y.2d 225, 282 N.E.2d 600, 331 N.Y.S.2d 636 (1972).
69 Dean McLaughlin has stated that "the parties charted a middle course between
the common law [which required that the performance or occurrence of all conditions
precedent be pleaded in detail] and the CPLR .... ".New York Trial Practice, 167
N.Y.L.J. 112, June 9, 1972, at 4, col. 3.
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reversed, holding that the defendant's general denial was sufficient to
put all the plaintiff's allegations in issue. The Court reasoned that
the particularity requirement was inapplicable because the plaintiff
had already specified the pertinent conditions in his complaint, and
thus the essential purpose of the requirement i.e., to give the plain-
tiff notice of that which he must prove at trial- was satisfied.70
CPLR 3016(c): Specificity of pleading requirement applied to counter-
claim in divorce action.
CPLR 5016(c) requires that the complaint in an action for sep-
aration contain the nature, circumstances, time, and place of each
act allegedly constituting the defendant's misconduct. In Deane v.
Deane,7 the Supreme Court, Westchester County, applied this plead-
ing requirement to the defendant's counterclaim72 for divorce, rea-
soning that since the ground pleaded, cruel and inhuman treatment,
is identically worded for separation and divorce,73 "[n]o distinction is
made between the nature or the level of proof required to establish
[this ground] insofar as it may relate to [either action]." 74 Thus, the
court concluded, the same standards of pleading should apply.
CPLR 3016(c) was created at a time when multiple grounds ex-
isted for separation, while the only ground for divorce was adultery,
and the pleading requirements for the latter were less than for the
former. When the grounds for divorce were expanded in 196775 no
pleading provision corresponding to CPLR 3016(c) was created.7 6 This
legislative inactivity prompted the Supreme Court, Delaware County,
in Houck v. Houck,77 to conclude that a complaint for divorce should
be given a more liberal reading than one for separation on identical
grounds.
Although the Deane court indicated that the consequences of fail-
ing to satisfy this section will be minimal - the delinquent party
may have to file an amended pleading or supply a bill of particulars,
70 30 N.Y.2d at 233, 282 N.E.2d at 603, 331 N.YS.2d at 641.
7169 Misc. 2d 1024, 332 N.Y.S.2d 302 (Sup. Ct. Westchester County 1972).
72 CPLR 3019(t) provides: "A cause of action contained in a counterclaim ... shall
be treated, as far as practicable, as if it were contained in a complaint ... 
73 Compare DRL 200(1) with DRL 170(l).
74 69 Misc. 2d at 1025, 332 N.YS.2d at 304.
75 DRL 170.
76 See 3 WK&M 3016.08.
77 59 Misc. 2d 1070, 300 N.Y.S.2d 999 (Sup. Ct. Delaware County 1968).
78 There is a disagreement as to whether a bill of particulars may be utilized for
this purpose. Several cases have stated that this device must be held inappropriate if
CPLR 3016(c) is to retain its effectiveness. See Pustilnik v. Pustilnik, 24 App. Div. 2d 868,
264 N.Y.S.2d 400 (2d Dep't 1965) (mem.), discussed in The Quarterly Survey, 41 ST. JoHN's
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